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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to consider this
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1992) and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Based on the record before it, did the district

court err by deciding that an applicant for Utah NO-Fault wage
loss benefits is entitled to receive those benefits for 52
consecutive weeks following the date of the applicant's injury
rather than a 52 week period commencing when benefits are first
requested?
Regarding this issue, the Utah Court of Appeals should
review the district court's decision for legal correctness.
2.

Based upon the record before it, which included

uncontested expert affidavits, did the district court err by
deciding that as a matter of law Allstate Insurance Company had
not breached its duty of good faith to its insured Kenneth
Larsen?
With regard to this issue, the Utah Court of Appeals
should review the district courts decision for legal
correctness.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ETC,
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i):

Personal Injury Protection coverages and
benefits include: the lesser of $250 per week
or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss
of earning capacity per person from inability
to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive
weeks after the loss, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three
days of disability unless the disability
continues for longer than two consecutive
weeks after the date of injury.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5):

Payment of the benefits provided for in
Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly
basis as expenses are incurred. . . . If
the insurer fails to pay the expenses when
due, these expenses shall bear interest at
the rate of 1%% per month after the due date.
The person entitled to the benefits may bring
an action in contract to recover the expenses
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer
is required by the action to pay any overdue
benefits and interest, the insurer is also
required to pay reasonable attorneys7 fee to
the claimant.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case.
On or about July 2, 1991, plaintiff Kenneth Larsen
commenced this action in the Utah District Court for the district
of Salt Lake County by filing a Complaint against Curtis L.
Porter, Levonne R. Edwards, Allstate Insurance Company, and John
Does 1 through 5.

(R. 00002-00009.)

Mr. Larsen alleged that he

was involved in an automobile accident on or about October 26,
1989, and that as a result of the negligence of defendants Porter
and Edwards suffered injuries in the accident.

Plaintiff sought

compensation in the form of special and general damages from
(Id.)

defendants Edwards and Porter.

Plaintiff also alleged that his insurer, Allstate
Insurance Company had wrongfully denied him certain Utah No-Fault
Benefits and in doing so had breached its duty of good faith.
Larsen sought recovery of the benefits allegedly due and damages
arising from the alleged breach of the duty of good faith.

(Id.)

Course of proceedings/disposition in the court below.
In lieu of an Answer to Larsen's Complaint, Allstate
Insurance Co. filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative a
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Allstate argued that under Utah law

3

and the provisions of its insurance contract with Mr. Larsen, it
had already paid all wage loss benefits due.

Allstate also

argued that because its actions were appropriate, and because an
exclusive statutory remedy in derogation of common law remedies
exists in the event benefits are wrongfully denied, Larsen had
failed to state a cause of action with regard to his alleged bad
faith claim.

(R. 00003-00074.)

After briefing and oral

argument, on November 8, 1991, the district court, Honorable
Richard H. Moffat presiding, granted Allstate's Motion to Dismiss
or in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.
the Minute Entry; R. 00120-00121, the Order.).

(R. 00119,

The judgment was

certified as final and this interlocutory appeal followed.

Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
1.

Commencing in September of 1989, and continuing

thereafter at all times relevant to this appeal, Kenneth Larsen
and the Allstate Insurance Co. were bound by the terms of a
automobile insurance contract, policy no. 020813344.

With regard

to personal injury protection wage loss benefits,1 the policy
provided at page 11 that whenever an injured person entitled to
coverage incurred bodily injury caused by an automobile accident
1

Wage loss benefits are a mandatory part of every Utah auto
liability policy pursuant to the Utah No-Fault Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(i).
4

that person would be entitled to certain wage loss benefits under
the following terms:
Allstate will pay to or on behalf of an
injured person the following benefits . . .:
(2) Work Loss
Loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the
injured person during his lifetime from inability to
work during a period commencing three days after the
date of bodily injury and continuing for a maximum of
52 consecutive weeks. (Emphasis in original.)
(R. 00058, page 11 of the insurance policy, see also,

R. 00050-

00052, uncontested affidavit of Allstate employee Louise Redmond
establishing that the policy quoted from was in fact the
appropriate, applicable policy; R. 00006, paragraph 30 of
plaintiff's Complaint.)
2.

On October 26, 1989, Kenneth Larsen sustained

bodily injury in an automobile accident.

(R. 0003, paragraph 9

of Larsen7s Complaint; R. 0004, paragraph 16 of Larsen's
Complaint; see also,

R.00070, a letter from Mr. Larsen's treating

physician Gordon R. Kimball, M.D., which states in pertinent
part:

"This patient was involved in a motor vehicle accident on

10/26/89 when he was rear ended and sandwiched between two cars.
The patient injured his spine at that time . . . "

(Emphasis

added.))
No evidence was submitted to the district court, nor
does any evidence appear in the record of this case indicating
5

that Mr. Larsen sustained his bodily injury at any time other
than October 26, 1989.
3.

On May 26, 1990, Mr. Larsen requested wage loss

benefits from Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to the personal
injury protection coverage of his policy and in response Allstate
paid wage loss benefits from May 26, 1990 to and including
October 25, 1990.

The total amount paid was $5r500.

(R. 00051,

paragraph 4 of the uncontested affidavit of Allstate employee
Louise Redmond.)
4.

On the advice of counsel and pursuant to its

internal investigation, Allstate Insurance Company determined
that Mr. Larsen was entitled to wage loss benefits commencing on
the date of the accident/injury and ending 52 consecutive weeks
thereafter.

Therefore, Mr. Larsen was paid wage loss benefits

from the date he requested such benefits to a date 52 weeks
following the date of the accident.

(R. 00051, paragraph 5, of

the uncontested affidavit of Allstate employee Louise Redmond.)
5.

At Count III of Larsen's Complaint he asserted

that Allstate should have paid wage loss benefits for 52
consecutive weeks commencing on the date plaintiff first
submitted a demand for wage loss benefits, rather than 52
consecutive weeks from the date of the accident and/or injury.
(R. 0006-0007.)
6

6.

Under Count IV of Larsen's Complaint, he alleged

that Allstate's decision to pay work loss benefits for 52
consecutive weeks after the date of injury, instead of after the
date demand was made was a breach of its duty of good faith.

(R.

0007-0008.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

The no-fault benefits issue.
No-fault legislation, including Utah/s No-Fault Act, is

designed to provide a quick, definite, but limited source of
funds on a no-fault basis to persons injured in automobile
accidents.

Utah appellate courts have consistently refused to

accept arguments that would expand benefits beyond those which
are specifically mandated by statute or that render benefits paid
under the Act generally less predictable, less definite, and less
precise or less efficient and more costly to administer.

Utah's

courts have also rejected arguments that would lead in any way to
an erosion of the Act's fundamental purpose of providing quick,
definite, but limited benefits to injured persons.

The Act was

never intended as a substitute for an individual's right to
recover compensation from an at-fault tort feasor.

7

Consistent

with those principles, Allstate urges this court to adopt a wage
loss benefit requirement that comports with:
1.

The No-Fault Act's language which requires that

benefits be paid 52 weeks after the loss and which, when read as
a whole, equates the date of loss with the date of the accident.
Courts from other jurisdictions have unanimously so held,
2.

The stated purpose of the Act, which is to provide

quick definite benefits to the insured, not as cippellant argues,
an open-ended entitlement which may long surpass the claimant's
immediate needs and which may require payment of benefits 10, 20,
or 40 years after the accident.

Such a perpetual liability would

make it impossible to adequately investigate the claimant's
entitlement to benefits and would be very costly to administer,
3.

Allstate's policy language which requires benefits

to be paid for 52 consecutive weeks after the date of bodily
injury, not, as appellant urges, beginning on an indefinite date
when claimant first takes off work which may be years after the
date of the accident.

Such a result would require insurance

companies to maintain loss reserves for every injured insured
indefinitely.
Although appellant's tortured reasoning would most
certainly result in greater benefits to injured parties, it would
do so at the expense of the fundamental purpose of the Utah No8

Fault Act, and would be contrary to the provisions of the
contract of insurance freely entered between Allstate and Mr.
Larsen.

The district court understood that and ruled

accordingly.

B.

That ruling should be affirmed.

The good-faith issue.
Where there is a fairly debatable reason for an

insurer's conduct or decision, that insurer cannot be said to
have breached its duty of good faith.

In this case, should the

Court of Appeals agree with Allstate, then obviously Allstate's
decision to pay benefits under its interpretation of the law and
its policy was not only fairly debatable, but was also correct.
On the other hand, if the Court of Appeals disagrees, then the
fact that the district court agreed with Allstate is
incontrovertible evidence that Allstate's position was at least
fairly debatable.
its attorney.

Furthermore, Allstate relied on the opinion of

An opinion that was set forth in an uncontested

affidavit submitted to the trial court.

As such Allstate met its

duty of good faith.
Additionally, Utah law provides an exclusive statutory
remedy in the event an insurer fails to pay appropriate no-fault
benefits.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5) if an insurer

fails to pay benefits when due, the claimant may bring an action
9

to recover those benefits and if successful, interest at the rate
of 1%% per month will be paid along with reasonsible attorneys7
fees.

Damages for mental pain and suffering such as sought by

appellant here are not provided for.

That remedial statute is in

derogation of the common law remedy and precludes the common law
remedy.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE
OP THE NO-FAULT ACT, THE LANGUAGE OP THE
NO-FAULT ACT, THE LANGUAGE OF ALLSTATE'S
INSURANCE POLICY, AND TO EFFECTUATE THE
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF NO-FAULT
BENEFITS, THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
Allstate submits that this court, just as the trial
court, should determine the duration of the insured's wage loss
benefits under the Utah No-Fault Act by first looking to the
purpose of the Act, then by interpreting the language of the Act
in light of that purpose (including reference to case law from
other jurisdictions in which this precise issue has been
addressed), and then, if there is some doubt as to the

10

interpretation of the Act, by reference to the Allstate insurance
policy.2
Therefore, the history and purpose of legislative nofault schemes in general and Utah's No-Fault Act specifically,
then the language of the Utah No-Fault Act, and then the language
of Allstate's policy are each addressed in turn hereafter.

Then

the reasons why the trial court's decision, rather than
appellant's position, is most appropriate are set forth.

A.

History/purpose/traditional interpretive guidelines of
the Utah No-Fault Act.
No-fault legislation now exists in a majority of states

to provide a quick, no nonsense, no frills way to provide
immediate funds to those injured in automobile accidents without
regard to who or what may have been responsible for the injuries.
Belcher

v.

Aetna

(Mich. 1980).

Casualty

& Surety

Company,

293 N.W.2d 594, 601

No-Fault Acts are not designed to provide

compensation for all economic losses suffered, but merely provide
an immediate source of funds while the injured party convalesces
2

Allstate concedes that it may not decrease by its policy
language the minimum benefits required by the Utah No-Fault Act.
However, where the No-Fault Act does not mandate a certain level or
duration of benefits, then the parties may contract for whatever
duration of benefits they desire. See, Farmers Insurance Company
v. U.S. Fidelity
and Guaranty
Co., 619 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980);
State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1043

(Utah 1987).
11

or until an appropriate claim for full compensation is pursued.
Id.;

Long, The Law of Liability Insurance. Volume 4, Section

27.04, page 47 (rev. 291); Little

v. Pepsi-Cola

786 (Kan. App. 1983); Ohio Casualty
Continental

Insurance

and Surety

Company,

656 P.2d

Company v.

Company, 421 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1979); Couch on

Insurance. 2d, Section 45:664.

It was the uncertainty in the

levels of compensation and the delay in compensation which led to
the enactment of no-fault legislation in the first place.

J.

Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice. Volume 8d, Section 5151 et
seq. "History of No-Fault Legislation" at pages 372-373 (1981).
Utah courts have consistently interpreted the Utah NoFault Act to provide for the least amount of controversy, the
most amount of certainty, and the most efficiency in spite of the
fact that such interpretations at times result in lower benefits
for injured parties.
Company,

See, Jones

v. Transamerica

Insurance

592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979) (the claimant's argument that

the insurer failed to pay disability benefits under the No-Fault
Act and by so doing breached its duty of good faith was not
accepted by the court in favor of a more narrow definition of
disability); Jamison

v. Utah Home Fire

Insurance

Company, 559

P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) (the Court refused to expand the nature of
household services benefits provided by the No-Fault Act); see

12

also,

Tanner

v. Phoenix

Insurance

Company, 799 P.2d 231 (Utah

App. 1990).
That approach is consistent with other jurisdictions.
Specifically, courts have refused to adopt the approach urged by
appellant in this case and have instead adopted Allstate's
position.

See, Glenn v. Farmers

and Merchants

649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. of Ark. 1986); Crieg
Property
1984).

and Casualty

Insurance

Insurance
v.

Company,

Prudential

Company, 686 P.2d 1331 (Colo.

Although the details of those two cases will be discussed

further herein infra,

the point is that courts and commentators

have consistently viewed no-fault legislation as a means to
provide limited benefits, for a limited period of time, to those
injured in automobile accidents and have consistently rejected
arguments that seek to expand benefits at the expense of
efficiency and certainty.
Insurance

Company,

See also,

Fleming

v.

Allstate

424 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 832 (1980) (the court noted

that no-fault legislation:

"Should not be so twisted and

extended as to confer on an injured party a benefit not intended
by the legislature." (citations omitted)).
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B.

The language of the Act,
Beginning at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(a) and

continuing through subparagraph (d) the Utah No-Fault Act defines
the minimum personal injury protection coverages and benefits
that must be included in all Utah automobile liability insurance
policies.

In general terms the Act mandates medical expense

reimbursement benefits, wage loss benefits, household service
benefits, and death benefits.

Both the wage loss benefits and

the household services benefits are limited in amount and
duration, while the medical expense benefits and death benefits
are limited in amount only.

Id.

at (a)-(d).

The Act,s

definition section offers no assistance regarding the operative
words at issue here.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-301(l)-(7).

Under the Act, with regard to wage loss benefits, an
insured is entitled to:

"the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of

any loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity per person
from inability to work".
to:

Such payments are limited in duration

"A maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss,

except

that benefits need not be paid for the first three days of
disability

unless the disability

consecutive weeks after the date
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(i) (1991).

continues for longer than two
of injury."

Utah Code Ann.

(Emphasis added.)

14

Three terms used in that section are critical:
loss,

(2) disability,

and (3) date

of injury.

(1) the

Presumably, in

order to avoid the payment of wage loss benefits for injuries
which produce a disability lasting three days or less, the
statute relieves an insurer from paying benefits for the first
three days of disability unless the disability continues for
longer than two consecutive weeks following the date of injury.3
Thus, the "date of the injury" is unquestionably a critical
moment in the calculation of wage loss benefits.

Also, by using

the date of disability (as opposed to the date of "the loss") to
compare with the date of injury a distinction has been drawn
between the date of disability and the date "the loss" occurs.
Had the legislature intended for the date of "the loss" and the
date of "the disability" to be identical, there would be no
reason to use the word disability in the same sentence as the
3

Allstate contends that the date of injury and the date of the
accident must necessarily be the same day.
Although every
manifestation of the injury may not occur until some days after the
accident, the injury itself, the physiological damage which gives
rise ultimately to an inability to work, must necessarily occur on
the date of the accident. Otherwise, the two events would not be
causally related. In any event, a resolution of that issue is not
necessary in this case. The record here establishes that at least
in this case the date of injury and the date of the accident are
one and the same. As is pointed out in Allstate's statement of
facts, the insured's primary treating physician stated in his
letter that the injury occurred on the date of the accident (R.
00070.) and such statement was set forth in Allstate's uncontested
facts section of its original memorandum and no opposing statement
of facts was submitted on that point by the insured.
15

term "the loss" is used.

The statute could have merely read:

"This benefit need not be paid for the first three days of the
loss."

Instead of:

"This benefit need not be paid for the first

three days of disability."

Thus, the term "the loss" must be

something different than "the disability".

The only other date

that has meaning in this context (aside from the date of
disability and the date of injury) is the date of the accident.
The accident must be what the legislature was referring to when
it adopted the term "the loss."

Therefore, the language of the

Act mandates payment of wage loss benefits from the date of the
accident to a date 52 weeks thereafter.

That is exactly what

Larsen received.
Notwithstanding the foregoing (and Allstate submits, a
similarly arcane argument made by appellant) the more the bare
language of the wage loss benefits section, without reference to
the purpose of th€> Act in general, is analyzed, dissected and
manipulated, the less clear it becomes.

The legislature could

have used language* that would have clearly and unequivocally
resolved the issue presented by this appeal.
did not.

Unfortunately, it

The Utah Supreme Court has been faced with the problem

of interpreting similarly imprecise language in the No-Fault Act
before.

In those instances, the Court has consistently eschewed

a formalized process of dissecting the bare language of the Act
16

in favor of looking to the purpose and function of the Act as a
guiding interpretive reference point•
Jamison

v. Utah Home Fire

Insurance

As the Court stated in

Company, 559 P. 2d 958 (Utah

1977) :
We have no hesitancy in agreeing that the
interpretation and application of the law
should be a process of reason, as contrasted
to a mere reading of tables or schedules, nor
that when controversies arise it is both
permissible and desirable to look to the
background and purpose of a statute to
ascertain its meaning and proper application
in particular circumstances.
Id.

at 959 (the Court was interpreting the extent of household

services benefits under the Utah No-Fault Act); see also,
v. Transamerica

Insurance

Jones

Company, 592 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1979)

(the Court evaluated the wage loss benefits in light of the
purposes of the Utah No-Fault Act.).
Likewise in this case, although Allstate considers its
interpretation of the bare language of the statute to be the most
accurate among the several less than perfect alternatives,
Allstate urges the court to interpret the language of the Act in
light of and influenced by the Act's history and purpose.

C.

The interpretation urged bv Allstate is most consistent
with the purpose of the Act.
In Tanner

v. Phoenix

Insurance

Company, 799 P.2d 231

(Utah App. 1990), this court held that where the Utah No-Fault
17

Act is capable of two meanings as understood by reasonably well
informed persons, the court must determine the legislature's
intent in light of the entire statute's purpose and in so doing
it is appropriate to examine the effect each plausible meaning of
the statutory language will have "in practical application.11

Id.

at 233.4
The Utah Supreme Court has twice set forth the purposes
of the Utah No-Fault Act and on each occasion has included the
reduction in the ever increasing cost of insurance, and the
payment, without undue delay, uncertainties and expenses of
specified primary damages for necessary medical and hospital
expense and loss of wages. Jamison,

559 P.2d at 959; Jones,

592

P.2d at 611.
4

Appellant's contention that any reasonable interpretation of
the statute which expands the level of benefits provided to the
insured
should
be preferred
over
any
other
reasonable
interpretation that limits benefits is not supportable. The Utah
Supreme Court has always resolved questions regarding the
interpretations of the Utah No-Fault Act by reference to the
history and purpose of the Act rather than by mechanical adherence
to whatever result will provide the greatest degree of benefits.
In fact, the Court has historically preferred interpretations which
result in more limited benefits when those interpretations further
the Act's purpose of providing a quick, definitive, but limited
form of compensation which is intended to supplement, rather than
replace traditional damages recoverable in a suit brought by the
injured party. Jamison,
559 P.2d at 959-962; Jones,
592 P.2d at
611-612. In Jamison, the Court rejected plaintiff's argument which
relied on a strict interpretation of the bare language of the
statute in favor of an interpretation which more closely comported
with the purpose of the statute even though plaintiff's contention
would have provided more benefits to the insured. Id. at 960.
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In summary, to interpret the pertinent section of the
statute, the court should consider the history and purpose of the
Act, and the practical effect of each of the available
alternative interpretations.

The interpretation that is most

consistent with the Act's purpose and most practical should be
favored.

See, e.g., Tanner

v. Phoenix

Insurance

Company, 799

P.2d at 233.
If appellant's interpretation of the statute is
accepted, a number of problems will occur which are at odds with
the statute's purpose and a practical approach to wage loss
benefits.

If as appellate contends an injured party may recover

wage loss benefits at any time following an injury for a period
of 52 consecutive weeks after demand is made, insurers will be
required to maintain an open file on every accident indefinitely
awaiting the potential of the injured party taking time off work.
A back injury may result in time off work for the first time ten
years after the accident and under appellant's interpretation of
the statute, that injured person could then make a claim against
an insurer for wage loss benefits for an injury occurring ten
years ago.

At that point it will be impossible for the insurer

to reconstruct the pertinent facts of the accident, the nature of
the injury, or to determine whether some intervening circumstance
occurred to cause the present inability to work.
19

It will be

impossible to close the file on any accident where the wage loss
benefits have not been exhausted and as a result, accurate
actuarial calculations regarding the cost of potential claims
will be impossible.

An insurer cannot evaluate what future

premiums should be when potential claims cannot be evaluated.
Each insurer will be faced with an ever increasing number of
open-ended potential wage loss claims that might be made at any
indefinite point in the future.

Furthermore, because the Utah

No-Fault Act provides for the reimbursement of the insurer that
pays no-fault benefits by the insurer insuring the at-fault
party, the potential for such reimbursement will last
indefinitely into the future.
(1991).

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)

Thus, not only will the injured party7s insurer face

perpetual indefinite liability, so will the tort feasor's
insurer.
Such an open ended potential for the payment of wage
loss claims is at odds with the Act's purpose of providing a
definite, short term, quick, but limited level of benefits while
the injured party determines whether to pursue other means of
recourse and is at odds with the Act's purpose of holding down
the cost of insurance.

The interpretation urged by appellant has

precisely the opposite effect as that intended by the
legislature.

An endless, expensive, indefinite, administrative
20

nightmare will result if appellant's theory is accepted.

Every

single auto accident in this state (assuming someone involved is
insured) will result in the creation of potential insurer
liability for wage loss benefits that will not end until every
person involved in the accident is dead.

The insurance contract

would remain executory until everyone who might benefit—
passengers, pedestrians, permissive users—are dead.
On the other hand, the interpretation urged by Allstate
will still provide the injured party immediate wage loss benefits
for an entire year after the accident or injury.

During that

time the injured party can presumably evaluate whether to pursue
other remedies.

The one year wage loss cushion which is provided

by Allstate's interpretation is entirely consistent with the
Act's purpose of making sure there are some benefits available
without undue delay while at the same time keeping the cost of
insurance down by limiting the duration of such benefits and
limiting the administrative cost of maintaining an indefinitely
open file.

Furthermore, Allstate's interpretation allows

investigation of the wage loss claim during a time when memories
are still fresh and medical treatment is most probably ongoing.
Thus, Allstate's interpretation strikes a balance between
providing the required benefits to the injured party and
efficiently administering the delivery of those benefits on a
21

cost effective basis.

Allstate's interpretation does not

necessarily reduce the benefits available, it merely provides for
a definite manageable time period within which those benefits can
be claimed.

Allstate submits that such a balance is far more

consistent with the purposes of the No-Fault Act than the onesided and administratively impossible interpretation urged by
appellant.
Courts from at least two other jurisdictions have faced
the precise issue presented by this appeal.

Although the

language of the respective No-Fault Acts varied from that used in
Utah's No-Fault Act, the reasoning used by those courts in
concluding that the wage loss benefits run from the date of the
accident or date of injury, rather than from an indefinite date
is applicable here.
Merchants

Insurance

For example, in Glenn v. Farmers

and

Company, 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. of Ark.

1986) the appellant argued that wage loss benefits should begin
to run from whenever the injured party first takes off work and
should continue for 52 consecutive weeks thereafter.

The

appellee, the insurance company, argued that such an
interpretation was impractical and that the only rational
interpretation was that benefits cease 52 weeks after the date of
the accident.

Id.

at 1450.

The court rejected the appellant's

argument on the basis that if carried to its logical conclusion,
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the insurer's liability for work loss benefits would never end
until the injured party dies and that benefits might be paid well
into the next century.

The U.S. District Court concluded that

the Arkansas legislature could not have intended such a result.
Id.
Another example is Crieg
Casualty

v. Prudential

Company, 686 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1984).

Property

&

Once again, the

injured party asserted that the Colorado No-Fault Act should be
interpreted to provide 52 weeks of wage loss benefits beginning
on the first day that time is taken off work, rather than at the
date of the injury or accident.

The Colorado Supreme Court

recognized that the Colorado No-Fault Act might be construed to
be ambiguous and could be interpreted as the injured party
asserted, but held that the injured party's contention must be
"analyzed in its immediate textual context and with regard to the
consequences of any particular construction."

Id.

at 1335.

Consistent with that approach, the Colorado Supreme Court
determined that the Colorado No-Fault Act's purpose of providing
"minimum coverages for discrete losses over a fixed and
determinate period of time" would be best served by concluding
wage loss benefits 52 weeks after the accident instead of an
indefinite time in the future.

Id.
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The Colorado court noted that any other construction
places insurers in the impossible position of being liable for
wage loss benefits in perpetuity:
Without such limitation, insurers would face
the prospect of liability in perpetuity for
work loss benefits. We find nothing in the
statutory scheme supportive of such a
construction.
Id.

at 1335.
Likewise*, nothing in the Utah No-Fault Act indicates a

desire by the legislature to impose such an onerous burden on
insurers.

Allstate concedes that different statutory language

was involved in the cases cited, but contends that the same
rationale which lead the Colorado Supreme Court to resolve an
ambiguity in the Colorado No-Fault Act in a way consistent with
that urged by Allstate in this case for very practical reasons,
and to reject the very interpretation urged by appellant, should
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also lead this court to the same conclusion.5

The decision of

the trial court should be affirmed.

D.

Allstate7s policy language.
If the Court does not find the foregoing argument to be

persuasive and instead finds that the Act does not provide for a
certain date upon which the 52 consecutive weeks of wage loss
benefits begin, then the Court is free to consider the language
of the insurance contract.
U.S. Fidelity

and Guaranty

See, Farmers Insurance

Company v.

Company, 619 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980)

(where the Court held that allowing the insurance policy to
control matters that are not addressed in the No-Fault Act struck
a balance between the Act's stated purposes of reducing the high
cost of auto insurance and providing a prescribed level of
benefits.); State

Farm Mutual Auto Insurance

v. Mastbaum, 748

P.2d 1042, 1043 (Utah 1987) (the Court cited Farmers

5

Insurance

At oral argument before the trial court, Larsen argued that
Utah's six year breach of contract statute of limitation could
limit wage loss claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Curiously,
however, the statute of limitation would actually only extend the
time within which to make a wage loss claim to a point 6 years
after the contractual obligation is due, i.e., under Larsen's
theory when the claimant first takes time off work. Under Larsen's
theory the breach would not occur until the insurer refused to pay
benefits and the statute of limitation would begin to run at that
time. Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746 P. 2d 1182, 1186 (Utah. App.
1987) . Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 offers no limitation to the
indefinite liability created by Larsen's theory.
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Company v.

U.S.

Fidelity

and Guaranty

Company,

619 P.2d at 333

with approval.)*
The Allstate insurance policy relevant here
unequivocally and unambiguously limits wage loss benefits to a
period of 52 consecutive weeks following the date of the bodily
injury.

The specific language provides:
Allstate will pay to or on behalf of an
injured person . . . loss of income and loss
of earning capacity by the injured person
during his lifetime from inability to work
during a period commencing three days after
the date of the bodily injury and continuing
for a mciximum of 52 consecutive weeks.
(Emphasis in original.)

See page 11, PART 2, paragraph 2 of the Allstate policy at R.
00058.
Under the clear language of the policy, the benefits
commence three days after the date of the bodily injury and
continue for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks.

Allstate has

unambiguously defined the starting point and the ending point of
benefits.

In this case, Allstate paid benefits for 52 weeks

after the date of bodily injury.6
Appellant has incorrectly directed the court's
attention to an entirely different section of the policy and then
argued that because no duration of benefits provision is set
6

Benefits concluded on October 25, 1990, 52 weeks after the
injury. (R. 00051.)
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forth there, no duration of benefits provisions exist.
(Appellant's brief at pages 12-13.)

Such an argument hardly

deserves response in light of the clear language of the policy
with regard to duration contained in that section of the policy
which specifically addresses the nature of work loss benefits
provided.

That Allstate did not redefine or reiterate those

points elsewhere in the policy is irrelevant.

Insurers are not

required to repeat provisions over and over again when the terms
are clearly set forth initially.
Appellant also contends that because Allstate's policy
restricts benefits to wage losses incurred during the injured
party's "lifetime" that a period longer than 52 weeks after the
accident is contemplated.

(Appellant's brief at pages 14-15.)

The "during his lifetime" limitation, however, is merely used to
avoid the payment of benefits after an individual is deceased.
In other words the "loss of earning capacity" cannot occur as a
result of death.
ways:

Thus, the period of benefits is limited in two

first, the loss of wages must occur while the injured

party is alive and second it must occur during a period
"commencing three days after the accident and continuing for . .
. 52 consecutive weeks."

That is what Allstate did in this
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case.7

The decision of the trial court should therefore, be

affirmed.8

POINT II
ALLSTATE'S POSITION IS "FAIRLY DEBATABLE"
AND THEREFORE CANNOT SUPPORT AN ACTION
FOR BAD FAITH
In Utah, if the position taken by an insurer in denying
an insured's claim is "fairly debatable", then the insurer has
met its duty of good faith to its insured.
and Surety
Hill

Company v. Marchant,

v. State

See, Western

Casualty

615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980);

Farm Mutual Insurance

Company, 183 Utah Adv. Rptr.

7

It should be noted that although Allstaters policy does not
require payment of wage loss benefits for the first 3 days after
the accident, the Act does require payment for the first three
days. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i) . Therefore Allstate
paid benefits according to the requirement of statute instead of
the policy. (R.00051.)
8

Appellant's other arguments—that the date of bodily injury
and the date of the accident are not defined as being the same date
under the policy and that ambiguities in the policy must be
construed in favor of the insured—are irrelevant. First, whether
the policy defines the date of injury and the date of the accident
as the same date is unimportant because in this case they did in
fact occur on the same date. No contrary evidence appears in the
Record and appellant did not contest that fact below. With regard
to the resolution of ambiguities, Allstate does not contest
appellant's statement of the law, however, the policy is simply not
ambiguous on this point. Payments are paid: "during a period
commencing three days after the date of bodily injury and
continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks."
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70, 73 (Utah App. March 27, 1992); Callioux
Insurance

v.

Progressive

Company, 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah App. 1987).
Obviously, in this case if this court agrees with

Allstate's position, then Larsen's claim for bad faith is not
well taken.
Even if the court disagrees with Allstate's
interpretation of the No-Fault statute, Allstate submits that its
position was still at the very least "fairly debatable".

Indeed,

the district court agreed with Allstate and granted summary
judgment.

Allstate submits that its position is "fairly

debatable" enough based upon the arguments set forth herein and
the fact that a district court judge agreed with those arguments
to preclude a claim for bad faith as a matter of law.
Additionally, Allstate,s position was supported by the
uncontroverted affidavit of its lawyer (R. 00072.).
Court of Appeals recognized in Callioux,

supra,

The Utah

that an experts

affidavit generally provides a good faith basis for an insurer7s
defense of a bad faith claim.

Callioux,

745 P.2d at 142. In

this case Allstate had requested and received opinions from its
counsel to the effect that wage loss benefits begin to run on the
date of injury, not an indefinite date in the future when the
injured party first takes time off work.
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Lastly, Larsen's bad faith claim is beirred because the
Utah No-Fault Act provides the exclusive remedy to an injured
party wrongfully denied no-fault benefits.

See, Utah Code Ann,

§ 31A-22-309(5) which provides that:
If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when
due, these expenses shall bear interest at
the rate of 1%% per month after the due date.
The person entitled to the benefits may bring
an action in contract to recover the expenses
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer
is required by the action to pay any overdue
benefits and interest, the insurer is also
required to pay reasonable attorneys' fee to
the claimant.
Id.

Therefore, instead of Larsen's action for bad faith and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, Larsen is limited
to recovering interest on the back benefits due and a reasonable
attorneys' fee.

The above quoted remedial section of the Utah

No-Fault Act is in derogation of the common law and expresses a
clear legislative intent to supply a limited remedy with regard
to the limited statutory benefits provided by the No-Fault Act.
As such, common law remedies such as Larsen's potential bad faith
claim are preempted.

See, Home v. Home,

737 P.2d 244, 248

(Utah App. 1987) cert, denied 765 P. 2d 1277.

In Home,

stated:
Where a statute is in derogation of the
common law, and is also remedial in nature,
the remedial application should be construed
so as to give effect to its purpose.
(Citations omitted.)
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the Court

Id.

See also,

DeFelice

(La. App. 1991).

Industries

Inc.

v. Harris,

573 S.2d 643

As part of the entire statutory no-fault

benefits scheme, the legislature has provided a specific precise
remedy in the event that benefits are wrongfully denied.

The

claimant is entitled to interest and attorneys' fees only.

No

mention is made of additional tort damages, and no mention is
made of the potential for punitive damages.

The legislature has

expressly limited the damages to those articulated, and has,
therefore, eliminated the uncertainties and vagaries of the law
of damages pertinent to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress and other insurance bad faith claims.

Mr. Larsen's

damages are clearly provided for and clearly limited and should
not be expanded beyond the legislative enactment to include
traditional bad faith damages.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Allstate Insurance Company
urges the court to affirm the decision of the trial court.
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